笔译备考实训 英译汉 第六单元 Passage 1、Passage 2

第六单元 金融

Passage1

Now, for those of you who aren’t techno-libertarians, Bitcoin is supposed to be a visual currency you can use to buy things online. Except it's not really a currency, and you can’t really buy that much with it. It’s more like a dotcom stock - circa 1999.

如今，不是技术自由主义者的人认为，比特币应是可以用于网上购物的虚拟货币。只是它并不是真正的货币，你也不能真正使用它来购买太多东西。比特币更像一支1999年前后的网络公司股票。

See, in just the last month, one Bitcoin has gone from closing at a then-record US$192 to reaching $788 on Monday. It then opened at $502 on Tuesday, before briefly rocketing up to $900, and ultimately falling to $646. Just your average 80 percent price swing. That’s totally normal for currencies, if you multiply their biggest swing by 80．

看，就在上个月，1比特币在周一从收盘时当时的最高点192美元升至788美元。周二开盘502美元，随后短暂地飙升至900美元，最后又跌到646美元。只有平均80％的价格波动。对货币来说，这是完全正常的，如果你把货币最大的波动幅度乘以80的话。

You can kind of see these absurd price moves in the chart. But only kind of, because the vertical up-and-downs have come so fast that they've blurred into each other. It’s almost as if Bitcoin doesn’t have a single price at any one time, but rather a range of possible prices that depend on the observer. We can see this a little better if we zoom in on just the last two months. Bitcoin prices were pretty flat from the end of September through early October, but then (relatively at least) doubled slowly. Then they doubled quickly. And then even quicker - before falling fast. Not exactly a stable store of value.

你可以通过图表略微了解这种荒唐的价格变化，但只是略微，因为垂直涨跌线的变化如此迅速，彼此已经重叠而模糊。看起来比特币似乎在任何时候都没有单一价格，而是一系列可能的价格，这取决于观察者。如果我们只放大观察过去两个月的情况，能更清楚地明白这一点。从9月底到10月初，比特币的价格相当平稳，但随后（至少比较）缓慢倍增，后来迅速倍增，再后来更快-进接着快速下跌。完全不是稳定的价值储存手段。

See, the idea behind Bitcoin is to create a decentralized currency that central banks can’t inflate and governments can’t tax. Basically, digital gold. And like actual gold, the only way to get new Bitcoins is to “mine” for them. That involves running a computationally-taxing programme on your computer that mostly generates gibberish, but maybe, just maybe, some Bitcoins, too. The key, though, is that mining for more of the virtual currency doesn’t create more of it. That’s because there’s a predetermined number of Bitcoins.

瞧，比特币背后的设想是创造一种分散化货币，各国央行不能让其升值，各国政府也不能对其征税。它基本上是一种电子黄金。与真正的黄金一样，获得新比特币的唯一方式是“开采"它们。这要求在你的电脑上运行一种计算繁杂的程序，该程序大多数情况下生成无意义的数据，但可能，只是可能，也同时生成一些比特币。然而，问题的关键是，开采出更多这种虚拟货币并不代表可以制造出更多比特币，这是因为比特币的数量是预先确定的。

Specifically, there are around 12 million today, and there will be 21 million in 2040 - and no more after that. Of course, this limited supply means Bitcoin should tend to increase in value against the dollar. But only tend to. See, its deflation means Bitcoin prices will go up and down quite violently.

具体地说，现在大约有120万比特币，20年将达到210万-此后不会再增加。当然，这种限量供应意味着比特币易于对美元升值。不过只是易于，其通缩趋势意味着比特价格会剧上涨或下跌。

Think about it this way. The supply of Bitcoins can’t increase much to meet increased demand, so increased demand will make prices soar. And soaring prices will make early adopters try to cash out their winnings - which will send prices crashing back down.

这样来理解比特币：比特币供应量无法增加太多，从而无法满足增加的需求，因此增加的需求会使其价格飙升。飙升的价格又会导致早期接受者试图将赢利套现，这样又会使价格狂跌回去。

Passage 2

The U. S. has wasted its “subprime” mortgage crisis. The story of how and why this has happened is of interest not only for its own stake, but for the broader themes it reveals. I am a theoretically trained economist who started investigating US housing finance markets more than 20 years ago.

美国未能汲取“次贷"危机的教训。不仅次贷危机本身的发生过程和原因值得关注，其所揭示的更广泛议題同样值得考察。我是一名有理论功底的经济学家，20多年前便开始研究美国房地产金融市场。

Nobel laureate Ro, Shiller and i separately made proposals to reduce systemic risk in the market. Yet our reform efforts went nowhere during the good times. We could not grab scarce public, press, or political attention with the claim that an apparently well- functioning system was profoundly flawed.

诺贝尔奖获得者佑特．席和我分别提出降低市场系统风险的建议。但是，在经济繁荣景气的时代，我们的改革提议白費唇舌。我们认为，当时表面运转良好的市场系统，实际上却千疮百孔，公众、传媒和政界对我们的观点置若罔闻。

Naively as it turned out, we each believed that the housing finance crash might finally cause more fundamental questions to be asked. After all, our ideas on risk sharing were directly relevant and would have lessened the impact of the crash. We each made specific proposals to speed recovery from the crash. For a while it seemed as if there would be real progress. Our hope was short-lived. Nothing positive has come out of the “subprime" crisis. The changes that have been made treat the nature and ignore the illness.

我们天真地以为，房地产金融危机也许终于会让人们提出更根本、更核心的问题。毕竟，我们关于分担风险的想法与此直接相关，并且会减轻危机的破坏力。我们分别提出危机后加快复苏进程的具体建议。曾有一度，我们似乎真的取得了进步，但我们的希望只是昙花一现：次貸危机没有带来任何积极的改变。所有的改革一直是治标不治本。

The US housing finance system is in worse shape than ever. The policy reform process is broken, and there is no quick fix sight. The breakdown of the reform process is simple to understand as it is tragic. Public servants can all too easily prevent experts from judging their performance. This leaves an inexpert press and a readily distracted public as the only sources of reformist pressure. The press commentates on policy responses based on ideological mandates from an ideological readership. The public tweets approval. Unexamined, institutions and opinions continue to ossify.

目前美国房地产金融系统的状况空前恶劣。政策改革进程中断，也看不到能快速解决问题的补救办法。改革进程停滞的原因很容易理解，也很可悲。公务员很轻易地就能规避专家评判其工作表现，这使得不专业的媒体和容易分心的公众成为仅有的改革压力的来源。媒体从意识形态受众的角度对基于意识形态的政策反馈发表评论。公众在推特发文表示赞成，而机构和舆论不经斟酌，继续固守成規。

The problem is deep and pervasive. Many policy-makers have much to fear from exposing their activities to experts who might attract public attention to their failings. Without experts, their performance simply cannot be assessed. This liberates spinners, which is positive for most in the press whose technical training leaves them unable to sort through the competing claims of knowledgeable experts and less knowledgeable policy-makers and pundits.

问题非常严重，而且普遍存在。许多决策者非常担心把活动曝光给专家后可能使民众注意到他们的失败。没有专家，他们的表现便无法得到评估。这让编故事的人获得了解放-大多数媒体中都确实存在这样的角色-他们所接受的技术训练有限，无法分辨博学的专家和不那么博学的决策者以及权威们各持己见的说法。

Even when reform is called for, it is impossible to effectively monitor implementation when experts are kept at arms’ length. Let me return briefly to the case of US housing finance policy. One must predict that Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHA will survive unscathed. Without fundamental re-thinking, risks will be allowed to multiply unseen. The seeds are even now being sowed for the housing crash of 2025 - 35 and the bailout of 2027-37.

即使民众要求变革，如果专家只是隔山打牛，也不可能有效监控改革的实施。让我迅速回到美国房地产金融政策一事吧。人们预测房利美公司、房地美公司和联邦住房管理局肯定会安然无恙地度过危机：但是如果人们没有根本性的反思，风险仍会在不知不觉中蔓延，甚至现在就已经埋下了2025至2035年房地产市场暴跌和2027至2037年救助的种子。

CATTI笔译备考实训